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Behind some recent discussions on internet governance, there is a broader contest for power and values in cyberspace. This contest is a sign of the so-called “post-liberal order”. As a
result, cyber-diplomacy becomes ever more needed to avoid a full fragmentation of cyberspace.




The Emergence of Cyber Diplomacy in an Increasingly Post-Liberal Cyberspace
In September 2019, a  that included China Mobile, China Unicom, and the
Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology proposed a signi�cant overhaul of the internet: A new top-down internet protocol called “
.” In their view, the proposed New IP would 
 the coming ultra-interconnectedness of the physical and digital worlds through virtual reality,
driverless cars, internet of things (IoT) and other emerging technologies. The group also argued that the internet in its current form has “
” [PDF]. Beyond these technical considerations, some
read this   as another chapter in a broader political move, which China and some
other countries have been   [PDF]: cyberspace can no longer
be dominated by the West and needs to re�ect the new balance of power in the international system.
This echoes an argument that we developed in “
.” The liberal international order, we argue, was articulated mainly around three concepts: Western power, liberal values, and Western-dominated
institutions. As we venture towards the end of the �rst quarter of the twenty-�rst century, international relations are becoming increasingly “
.” Although the exact contours of the new order are still in the making, it will certainly be less Western, less liberal and potentially less cooperative.
Cyberspace is also becoming increasingly post-liberal. The power relations, values, and institutions that governed it since its initial development in the 1960s are being challenged by
those that did not have a say in how it was structured. Although international divergences over internet regulation can be traced back to the 1990s, they are now more intense than
ever.
The New IP proposed by the Huawei-led group can be seen as part of a broader, albeit not necessarily interconnected set of initiatives that aim to rebalance power relations in the
regulation of cyberspace. Some of these initiatives have been introduced in the United Nations, where the global cybersecurity agenda was originally driven by discussions held by the
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). In September 2018, the UN General Assembly approved the creation of not one, but two 
 for the �rst time. One was the U.S.-sponsored sixth edition of the GGE. The other was the 
 (OEWG), proposed by Russia and open to all UN member states. These two processes have partially overlapping membership (all the GGE members are also, by default,
OEWG members) and discuss very similar issues during (roughly) the same period. The 109 votes in favor of Russia’s proposal to form the OEWG clearly signaled many governments’
support for a broader discussion beyond the exclusive GGE and new perspectives on cybersecurity and internet governance that differ from those championed by the West for
decades.
Last year, Russia also   the creation of another committee of
experts with the ultimate aim of developing an international cybercrime treaty to replace the 
. Russia’s resolution was   [PDF] by seventy-nine states—including swing states such as India,





rwy38DuesxBys19cA76s3c5Y5NCdJiuDg4pj-vaLpGN0SOMOffBH0n4f9) better support (https://www.internetsociety.org/resources
/doc/2020/discussion-paper-an-analysis-of-the-new-ip-proposal-to-the-itu-t/)
lots of security, reliability and con�guration
problems (https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/2019101416/Documents/Sheng_Jiang_Presentation.pdf)
proposal (https://www.ft.com/content/ba94c2bc-6e27-11ea-9bca-bf503995cd6f?shareType=nongift)
conveying for a while (https://ccdcoe-admin.aku.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/UN-110912-CodeOfConduct_0-1.pdf)





gge) Open-Ended Working Group (https://www.cfr.org/blog/�rst-global-meeting-cyber-
norms)
proposed (https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-un-cybercrime-treaty-way-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet)
Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention (https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions
/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185) approved (https://www.undocs.org/A/74/401)
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Indonesia and South Africa—with thirty-three abstentions, while sixty states voted against it. This revealed, once again, the attractiveness of not only Russian initiatives, but also new
non-Western efforts to determine how cyberspace is governed internationally.
The New IP proposal further highlights the role played by big tech in shaping the geopolitical debate on cyberspace. Discussions on the geostrategic and security implications of a 5G
infrastructure dominated by Huawei ruled the pre-COVID-19 agenda and have even been included in multiple 
 on the topic. In the West,  , 
, and other companies are also actively contributing
to the debate on responsible state behavior, often exhibiting state-like behavior themselves. For example, Microsoft recently announced the creation of its 
 that, among other aims, will “focus on advancing Microsoft’s
partnerships with the United Nations and its agencies.”
The Emergence of Cyber Diplomacy
While the liberal international order enabled the development of cyberspace, the move towards a post-liberal order has seen the advent of 
, i.e., the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national
interests in cyberspace. In the last decade, dozens of foreign ministries have been creating of�ces exclusively dedicated to cyberspace and appointing “
” in order to respond to the growing politicization of cyberspace and broader techno-geopolitical dynamics. This
move has concentrated more international cyber policy activities in foreign affairs ministries, elevating the issue in government hierarchies and increasing the level of international
activity of each state in cyberspace.
In a world in which more countries are acquiring offensive  , cyber diplomacy is needed to
prevent escalation or wrongful attribution of cyberattacks by maintaining a constant dialogue between peers and ensuring channels of communication remain open, even in times of
crisis. It also is necessary for developing binding and non-binding norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and addressing the most acute divergences between stakeholders
in this area. This is possible through multilateral fora such as the GGE and the OEWG, regional efforts like the 
 [PDF] con�dence-building measures, and bilateral agreements such as the 2015 
.
Overall, in a cyberspace that used to be predominantly regulated by IT experts and engineers, cyber diplomats are now actively navigating between trying to generate consensus
among stakeholders and, as a last resort, building bridges between fundamentally different, if not incompatible visions. The former demands an acceptance of the lowest common
denominator, possibly sacri�cing core values in the name of a stable international order of cyberspace. The latter entails a recognition of the failure to maintain a homogeneous
cyberspace and the acceptance of  . As con�icting visions for the future of the
global internet inevitably collide, cyber diplomats will have to negotiate these dif�cult choices.
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
(https://www.osce.org/pc/227281?download=true) U.S.-China Cyber Agreement
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less interconnected networks (https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/tackle-splinternet)
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